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Abstract
Since the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model
of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged
that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conﬂict between individual
strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically
are the sources of ineﬃciency. We approach this omission by analyzing the role of
positive and negative externalities of link formation. This yields general results that
relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be “too
dense” in a well-deﬁned sense, while situations with negative externalities tend to
induce “too dense” networks.
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11 Introduction
The importance of social and economic networks has been widely recognized in economics,
as well as in other social sciences. Applications include personal contacts (e.g. Gra-
novetter, 1974), scientiﬁc collaborations (e.g. Newman, 2004), trade between countries
(e.g. Goyal and Joshi, 2006b), embeddedness of companies (e.g. Uzzi, 1996), and even
marriages of ancient trading families (Padgett and Ansell, 1993).
Given the prevalence of network structure in many economic situations, it seems natural
to ask how networks change, when agents alter the network structure in order to pursue
their goals. It was a major contribution of the economics literature to propose such models
based on game theoretic concepts. The ﬁrst non-cooperative game theoretic approach to
two-sided network formation can be found in Myerson (1991). Myerson (1991) proposes
a simultaneous move game of network formation, where players announce their desired
links non-cooperatively. A link between two players is formed if both players announce
it.
Alike in non-cooperative game theory, a central issue in the theory of network formation is
the analysis of equilibrium or stability, i.e. a situation where no player wants to change her
links. The standard formulation of Nash-equilibrium in the Myerson network formation
game has proved to be a non-satisfying concept due to coordination problems.1 The
seminal contribution of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) solves this problem by introducing
a diﬀerent concept of stability called pairwise stability. In a pairwise stable network no
two players want to form a mutual link and no player wants to cut a link unilaterally.
This concept of stability is used and has been reﬁned widely in the literature of network
formation games.2 For diﬀerent models of network formation, Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) characterized pairwise stable and eﬃcient networks by introducing the utilitarian
welfare function.3 They highlight a central problem in strategic network formation: there
is a tension between stability and eﬃciency, meaning that individual interest can be
at odds with societal welfare. Since then, there was a ﬂourishing literature on speciﬁc
situations of strategic network formation of which two small surveys can be found in
Jackson (2004) and Goyal and Joshi (2006a). Some models can be found that analyze the
formation of directed networks, e.g. Bala and Goyal (2000), and weighted networks, Bloch
and Dutta (2005) and Rogers (2006). The various network formation games provide micro-
based models and analyze which networks are stable under various notions of stability
and which are eﬃcient.
What has not been explicitly studied are the sources of ineﬃciency. The question is
particularly, how stable networks generally diﬀer from eﬃcient networks? And, why
individual interest does not always lead to eﬃcient outcomes?
We approach these questions by analyzing the role of externalities, or spillovers, of link
formation. Simply put, positive externalities deﬁne situations where agents can proﬁt
1Any link, that is desired by both players is not necessarily present in Nash-equilibrium if neither
player announces it, e.g. the empty network is always an equilibrium.
2Among the most well-known reﬁnements are pairwise Nash stability, Bloch and Jackson (2006);
unilateral stability, Buskens and Van de Rijt (2005); strong stability, Jackson and Van de Nouweland
(2005); and bilateral stability, Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007).
3E.g. the connections model and the co-author model.
2(at least do not suﬀer) from others who form a relationship; while negative externalities
mean that they do not beneﬁt from that action. We argue that both types of externalities
correspond to natural settings. Network formation games where direct and indirect
connections are the source of beneﬁts represent examples for positive externalities. On
the other hand, in a context of competition or rival goods, negative externalities occur.
To compare stable and eﬃcient networks in both contexts, we ﬁrstly employ and analyze
two well-known notions of stability: pairwise stability, as introduced in Jackson and Wolin-
sky (1996) and pairwise stability with transfers, which stems from a network formation
game allowing for transfers.4 In addition to our main ﬁndings, we also elaborate on the
relation of these concepts. In analyzing the welfare properties of these stable networks,
we use a very general set of welfare functions, which have to satisfy only a monotonicity
property.5 Given a welfare function, we introduce the notion of over-connected and under-
connected networks. In essence, a network is over-connected if welfare can be improved by
deleting some links, while a network is under-connected if an addition of links is welfare
improving. We show how this notion helps identify the sources of ineﬃciencies and can
be applied to characterizing stable and eﬃcient networks.
The main result for positive externalities is that there is no stable network that can be
socially improved by the severance of links. This result is not dependent on the particular
shape of the utility functions nor on the degree of homogeneity. We provide some examples
taken from literature – among them is the connections model (see Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996) – and illustrate the implications of the result. For negative externalities the tension
between stability and eﬃciency is just the other way round: In various models of network
formation, we observe that eﬃcient networks are altered by individuals adding links, a
process that leads to stable networks which are “too dense” from a societal point of view.
In the context of transfers, we show that no stable network can be socially improved by
the addition of links. Without the assumption of transfers, additional insights are won
by restricting attention to a large class of network formation models, where the utility
function only depends on the number of links all the players have. Among them are the
co-author model, ﬁrstly introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), and the model of
patent races by Goyal and Joshi (2006a). Furthermore, we derive properties of the utility
function that are suﬃcient for equivalence between pairwise stability with transfers and
pairwise stability. In that case, the result of not being under-connected carries over to
pairwise stable networks.
Finally, we extend our analysis to a more general framework that is not restricted to
undirected and unweighted networks. The framework includes the formation of networks
with directed ties, weighted ties, negative ties, and networks with loops (self-links).
The ﬁrst result addresses models of bilateral network formation, in which a condition
called “rejection power” is satisﬁed. This includes all models based on the Myerson
link announcement game. We show for positive externalities that a Nash stable network
cannot be over-connected. The second result addresses virtually any model of unilateral
network formation. It shows for negative externalities (and positive externalities), that
4See Bloch and Jackson (2007) for diﬀerent approaches to network formation allowing for transfers.
For a comparison of the two equilibrium concepts see Bloch and Jackson (2006).
5The utilitarian welfare function satisﬁes this notion. For some of the results, we actually need this
speciﬁc version of a welfare function.
3a Nash stable network cannot be under-connected (respectively over-connected). This
result, holding for the general class of monotonic welfare functions, is brieﬂy discussed
with respect to the models of Bala and Goyal (2000).
The paper is organized as follows: the subsequent section formally deﬁnes the model. The
implications of positive externalities on the tension of stability and eﬃciency are shown
in Section 3. Section 4 addresses negative externalities and relates the diﬀerent stability
notions. Section 5 presents an extension of our model. More speciﬁcally, we verify how
our results carry over to a framework that includes the formation of weighted and directed
ties. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model and Deﬁnitions
Let N = {1,...,n} be a (ﬁnite, ﬁxed) set of agents/players, with n ≥ 3. A network/graph
g is a set of unordered pairs, {i,j} with i 6= j ∈ N, that represent the bilateral connections
in a non-directed graph. Thus, ij := {i,j} ∈ g means that player i and player j are linked
in network g. Let gN be the set of all subsets of N of size two and G be the set of all
possible graphs, G = {g : g ⊆ gN}.
By Ni(g) we denote the neighbors of player i in network g, Ni(g) := {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}.
Similarly, Li(g) denotes the set of player i’s links in g, Li(g) := {ij ∈ g | j ∈ N}. We
deﬁne di(g) := |Li(g)| = |Ni(g)|, as the number of player i’s links, called player i’s degree.
For each player i ∈ N a utility function ui : G → R expresses his preferences over the
set of possible graphs. u = (u1,...un) denotes the proﬁle of utility functions. Decisions
to form or to sever links typically do not depend on absolute utility, but on marginal
changes in utility. Let mui(g,l) be the marginal utility of player i of deleting a set of links
l currently in network g, that is mui(g,l) := ui(g)−ui(g \l) for (l ⊆ g). Equivalently, we
denote mui(g ∪l,l) := ui(g ∪l)−ui(g) as the marginal utility of adding the set of links l
to network g.
Each (exogenously given) triple (N,G,u) deﬁnes a situation of strategic network for-
mation. From the vast literature of network formation, we employ two of the most
common stability notions.6 The ﬁrst notion is based on a cooperative framework and
was introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Deﬁnition 1. A network g is pairwise stable (PS) if no link will be cut by a single player,
and no two players want to form a link:
(i) ∀ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g\ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g\ij) and
(ii) ∀ij / ∈ g, ui(g ∪ ij) > ui(g) ⇒ uj(g ∪ ij) < uj(g).
This well-known deﬁnition captures the idea that links can be severed by any involved
player, whereas the formation of a link requires the consent of both players. Pairwise
stability is a basic notion that can be reﬁned in multiple ways (e.g. unilateral stability,
6A game theoretic foundation and a comparison of the three notions can be found in Bloch and Jackson
(2006).
4Buskens and Van de Rijt, 2005; strong stability, Jackson and Van de Nouweland, 2005;
or bilateral stability, Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007).7
The second notion of stability is based on the idea of transfers and can be found in Bloch
and Jackson (2007).
Deﬁnition 2. A network g is pairwise stable with transfers (PSt) if there does not exist
any pair of players that can jointly beneﬁt by adding, respectively cutting, their link:
(i) ∀ij ∈ g, ui(g) + uj(g) ≥ ui(g \ ij) + uj(g \ ij) and
(ii) ∀ij / ∈ g, ui(g) + uj(g) ≥ ui(g ∪ ij) + uj(g ∪ ij).
We denote by [PS(u)],[PSt(u)] the sets of stable networks for a utility proﬁle u.
While stability tries to answer which networks emerge based on individual preferences,
eﬃciency addresses the evaluation of networks from a societal point of view. To formally
capture eﬃciency, we use a welfare function w : Rn → R that typically (but not necessar-
ily) is only dependent on the vector of utilities of all players, given a network g. Abusing
notation we will also write w(g) instead of w(u(g)). The most commonly used version of
a welfare function is the utilitarian welfare function, which simply sums up the utility of
all players, wu(g) =
P
i∈N ui(g). For some of our results, however, an even weaker way of
aggregating utility is suﬃcient. We only require a welfare function to satisfy monotonicity,
that is: ui(g) ≥ ui(g0) ∀i ∈ N =⇒ w(u(g)) ≥ w(u(g0)). This assumption is a very
intuitive and weak requirement for a welfare function. A welfare function should evaluate
a network g at least as high as a network g0 if all players i ∈ N evaluate g at least as high
as g0.
Given a welfare function w, we can deﬁne eﬃciency:
Deﬁnition 3. A network g∗ is called eﬃcient with respect to the welfare function w if it
is a welfare maximizing network, that is w(g∗) ≥ w(g) ∀g ∈ G.
In many network formation games we observe a general tension between stability and
eﬃciency.8 Individual interest often conﬂicts with social welfare. In the following we
want to ask under what conditions this tension is observed. Speciﬁcally, we ask whether
networks are “locally” eﬃcient in a sense that neither links can be added nor severed to
increase overall welfare, and if not, we want to know how overall welfare can be improved.
We use the following two deﬁnitions in order to describe non-eﬃcient networks.
Deﬁnition 4. A network g is called over-connected (with respect to the welfare func-
tion w) if ∃g0 ⊂ g such that w(g0) > w(g).
Deﬁnition 5. A network g is called under-connected (with respect to the welfare func-
tion w) if ∃g0 ⊃ g such that w(g0) > w(g).
7Therefore, all results that we derive for all pairwise stable networks, e.g. non-eﬃciency of pairwise
stable networks, carry over to any stronger notion of stability.
8See Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) for a general statement and Jackson (2004) for some more examples.
5A network is over-connected if it is “too dense” in the sense that overall welfare can be
improved by cutting links. Similarly, under-connected networks are “not dense enough”.
Eﬃcient networks are neither over-connected nor under-connected, while all supernet-
works of eﬃcient networks are either over-connected or eﬃcient and all subnetworks are
either under-connected or eﬃcient. Note that for any given w, a network can satisfy
both, one, or none of these two properties. To shed some light into the tension between
stability and eﬃciency, we will ask whether and under what conditions stable networks
are over-connected or not under-connected, respectively under-connected or not over-
connected. Our approach is very general and can be applied to most models of network
formation. We discuss the implications of our results for the tension between stability
and eﬃciency and also some of the implications for the characterization of stability and
eﬃciency. Furthermore, from the perspective of a social planner, this gives some insights
whether to subsidize or to tax the formation of links in order to arrive in a socially
preferred outcome.
3 Positive Externalities
We start by drawing our attention to network formation games with positive externalities.
Positive externalities in network formation games simply capture that two players forming
a link cannot decrease other players’ utilities. Diﬀerently put, players experience positive
eﬀects on their utility from others forming a link. Deﬁning it formally we get:
Deﬁnition 6. A proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes positive externalities if ∀g ∈
G,∀ij / ∈ g,∀k ∈ N \ {i,j} it holds that
uk(g ∪ ij) ≥ uk(g).
Being required for any network, any link and any player, this property seems quite
restrictive. However, we argue that there are many such contexts, and we can easily
ﬁnd examples in the literature on strategic network formation that satisfy this property.
Among them are “Provision of a pure public good” (Goyal and Joshi, 2006a), “Mar-
ket sharing agreements” (Belleﬂamme and Bloch, 2004), and the “Connections model”
(Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996), which we discuss below. In case of a utility function that
is additive separable into costs and beneﬁts (where costs only depend on own degree),
positive externalities are implied by a simple monotonicity property of the beneﬁt function.
In this context, players have to carry the costs of their own links, but share the beneﬁts
with others. Intuitively, individual incentives to establish a link might be lower than its
collective value because of positive externalities.
Thus a link could be socially desirable, but conﬂicts with the individual interest of both
involved players. The other way around, however, is not possible: if two players agree
to form a link, then this link is always socially desirable because of positive externalities.
We need one additional property to strengthen this observation. Consider the following
deﬁnition (taken from Hellmann (2009)):
Deﬁnition 7. A proﬁle of utility functions u is concave (in own links), if ∀i ∈ N,∀g ∈
G, and ∀li ⊂ Li(gN \ g),∀ij ∈ g it holds
mui(g,ij) ≥ mui(g ∪ li,ij).
6Informally put, the property requires that the marginal contribution of a link for a player is
decreasing in the set of links he already has. Hellmann (2009) shows that this concavity
property is equivalent to two notions we ﬁnd in the literature. The ﬁrst one is called
“convexity in own current links” (see e.g. Bloch and Jackson, 2007): A proﬁle of utility
functions u is convex in own current links if ∀i ∈ N,∀g ∈ G,and ∀l ⊆ Li(g) it holds that
mui(g,l) ≥
P
ij∈l mui(g,ij). The second property equivalent to concavity is known as “(1-
)concavity in own new links” (see Calv´ o-Armengol and Ilkili¸ c, 2007): A proﬁle of utility
functions u is concave in own new links if for all i ∈ N, for all g ∈ G and for all links l such
that l ⊆ Li(gN), and l ∩ g = ∅ the following holds: mui(g ∪ l,l) ≥
P
ij∈l mui(g ∪ ij,ij).
We will use this equivalence in the proofs of Theorem 1, Theorem 2, and Theorem 3.
With these deﬁnitions in hand, we can now formalize the intuition that stable networks
are rather not dense enough compared to eﬃcient networks. In fact, the following result
shows that a stable network can never be improved by the deletion of links.
Theorem 1. If a proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes positive externalities and concavity,
then no pairwise stable network is over-connected with respect to any monotonic welfare
function w, that is ∀g ∈ [PS(u)] it holds that 6 ∃g0 ⊂ g : w(g0) > w(g).
All proofs can be found in the appendix. To prove this result, we show that any player is
worse oﬀ in a subnetwork g0 of a PS network g.9 Pairwise stability together with concavity
implies that a player cannot prefer a network ˜ g(⊂ g) that has only been reduced by some
of his own links. Because of positive externalities, he cannot prefer a subnetwork g0 ⊂ ˜ g
of the reduced network.
Positive externalities are one source for the ineﬃcient outcome of under-connected net-
works. A second source can be the miscoordination between two players. Since pairwise
stability assumes that each link needs bilateral consent, it can happen that one player
i cuts a link (ij) although j would have heavily beneﬁted from that link. Pairwise
stability with transfers excludes this source of ineﬃciency. While PS requires that no
agent improves his utility by cutting a link, pairwise stability with transfers is a bit
weaker in this respect (because the other player involved can compensate him for keeping
the link). To establish the corresponding result for pairwise stability with transfers, we
restrict attention to the utilitarian welfare function.
Theorem 2. If a proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes positive externalities and concavity,
then no g ∈ [PSt(u)] is over-connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
The assumptions on the utility function, namely positive externalities and concavity,
appear in many models of networks formation, some of which will be analyzed subse-
quently. There are models however that only fulﬁll the assumptions of the theorems for
a smaller domain of networks.10 For two networks g,g0 ∈ G such that g ⊂ g0, let the
set [g,g0] be deﬁned as the set of all networks containing g and being contained in g0,
[g,g0] := {g00 ∈ G|g ⊆ g00 ⊆ g0}. When requiring the assumptions to hold only for a
smaller domain ˜ G ⊂ G, with the additional assumption that [g∅,g] ⊆ ˜ G for all g ∈ ˜ G, the
results carry over to that domain.
9The result also implies that no subnetwork of a PS network is Pareto better, but is much stronger
than that.
10In the case of negative externalities this is shown in the example of free trade agreements.
7Remark 1. Suppose u satisﬁes positive externalities and concavity in own links on a
domain ˜ G ⊆ G, such that for all g ∈ ˜ G it holds that [g∅,g] ⊆ ˜ G. Then no g ∈ ˜ G, which
is pairwise stable with transfers or pairwise stable is over-connected with respect to the
utilitarian welfare function.
The results excluding over-connectedness have trivial implications for the complete and
empty network. As any network is a subnetwork of the complete network, it follows that
(a) if the complete network is stable, then it must also be eﬃcient. Since any network is
a supernetwork of the empty network it follows that, (b) if the empty network is uniquely
eﬃcient, then no other network can be stable. Next, we study some models of network
formation from the literature and show how to apply our results.
The Connections Model Revisited
The connections model was introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). It models the
ﬂow of resources (like information or support) via shortest paths in a network. Let
dij(g) denote the distance of players i and j in network g (which is deﬁned to be ∞ for
unconnected pairs), then the utility of each player can be written as
u
CO







cij, with δ ∈ (0,1). (1)
It is easy to see that the connections model satisﬁes positive externalities. If ij forms
in some network g, then the utility of a player k 6= {i,j} either does not change or
increases as some of k’s distances are shortened because dkm(g ∪ ij) ≤ dkm(g) for all ij
and m. Moreover, it can be shown that that uCO(·) satisﬁes concavity. By the result of
Hellmann (2009) it suﬃces to show that uCO satisﬁes convexity in own current links, that
is ∀i ∈ N,∀g ∈ G,and ∀l ⊆ Li(g), it holds that mui(g,l) ≥
P
ij∈l mui(g,ij). This has
been done by Calv´ o-Armengol and Ilkili¸ c (2007) for the symmetric connections model.
We make a straightforward generalization of their proof.11
Lemma 1. The heterogeneous connections model satisﬁes concavity.
Consequently (by Theorem 1 and Theorem 2), no pairwise (Nash) stable network can
be over-connected w.r.t any monotonic welfare function and no pairwise stable network
with transfers can be over-connected w.r.t. the utilitarian welfare function. While stable
networks depend on the dyadic speciﬁcations of value and costs (wij, cij), the results
excluding over-connectedness imply that the welfare of a stable network can never be
improved by severing links.
There are more speciﬁc results for the connections model in its symmetric version, setting
wij = 1, cij = c (∀i 6= j) and considering the utilitarian welfare function wu only. This
has been studied in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), Jackson (2003), Hummon (2000), and
Buechel (2008) among others. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996, Prop. 1 and Prop. 2) show
11In fact, such a generalization can be made for any distance-based utility function in the sense that
beneﬁts are decreasing with distances and costs only depend on direct links.
8that for low costs (c < δ − δ2) the complete network is eﬃcient (and uniquely pairwise
stable); for medium costs (δ − δ2 < c < δ + n−2
2 δ2) the star network is eﬃcient; while for
very high costs (c > δ + n−2
2 δ2) the empty network is eﬃcient. Their famous statement
of ineﬃciency in the connections model is the following: “For δ < c, any pairwise stable
network which is non-empty is such that each player has at least two links and thus is
ineﬃcient.”12
What does our result excluding over-connectedness add to their discussion of ineﬃciency?
First, there is the above mentioned trivial implication for the empty network: Since any
network is a supernetwork of the empty network, it follows that if the empty network is
uniquely eﬃcient, then no other network can be stable. Thus, the statement of ineﬃciency
is restricted to δ < c < δ + n−2
2 δ2. Second, the result on over-connectedness adds a new
point of view on the ﬂavor of ineﬃciency. This can be illustrated in the following example,











Figure 1: Example of an ineﬃcient network (“Tetrahedron”).
Example 1. The network in ﬁg. 1, called “Tetrahedron”, is stable for costs c > δ, where
the star network is uniquely eﬃcient.13 The tetrahedron is “too dense” in the sense that
it has 18 links, while the eﬃcient network has 15. Accordingly, Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996, p. 51) label it as “over-connected”. However by Theorem 1, it is not over-
connected according to the deﬁnition used in this paper. This means that the welfare of
the tetrahedron cannot be improved by leaving out some of its links. Moreover, we claim
that the tetrahedron is under-connected in the parameter range such that it is pairwise
stable. In the appendix we show that the addition of a link between the players “2” and
“6” would strictly improve utilitarian welfare. The same point as in the Tetrahedron can
be illustrated in a circle graph of n ≥ 7: both networks are under-connected for any costs
for which they are pairwise stable.
The example illustrates two diﬀerent viewpoints on ineﬃciency (in the connections model).
From the viewpoint of a social planer that can unrestrictedly manipulate a given network,
some stable networks are “too dense” in the sense that less links are needed to form the
eﬃcient one. From the viewpoint of a social planer who is restricted to either foster or
12Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), p. 51.
13More precisely, gTetra is pairwise stable iﬀ δ −δ5 +δ2 −δ4 +δ2 −δ5 +2(δ3 −δ4) ≤ c ≤ δ −δ8 +δ2 −
δ7 + δ3 − δ6 + 2(δ4 − δ5).
9hinder the formation of links (e.g. by taxes or subsidies), many stable networks in the
connections model are “not dense enough” (under-connected), while none is “too dense”
(over-connected).
Market Sharing Agreements
Besides the connections model, it is easy to ﬁnd further examples for positive externalities
(and concavity in own links). Among them is the model of “market sharing agreements”
described in Goyal and Joshi (2006a). In this model, there are n ﬁrms and n markets,
where each ﬁrm has one home market and can be active in all other markets, too. Before
starting a Cournot competition in each market, bilateral agreements can be made to stay
out of each other’s home market.
The reduction of competitors in the own market might be proﬁtable. However, all
remaining competitors in the market beneﬁt from these activities without paying for
it. That is why the utility function of this example exhibits positive externalities. In
addition, it satisﬁes concavity, such that both results above (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2)
apply. Consequently, positive externalities lead to rather too few agreements with respect
to a monotonic welfare function. Note that such a function only covers ﬁrms’ utility, but
not consumers’.
Provision of a Pure Public Good
Another example of a network formation model that satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorems
1 and 2 is the “provision of a pure public good” model by Goyal and Joshi (2006a)
who extended a model of Bloch (1997). In this model, n players choose an output
level xi (second stage), which is valuable for everybody ˜ πi(x) =
P
i∈N xi. Collaboration
(knowledge sharing) between any two players is costly, but can reduce the marginal costs
of producing the output (ﬁrst stage).14 Assuming that any player chooses his output












where the ﬁrst term is the diﬀerence of own output and production costs, the second term
is the output of all other agents, and the last term is the costs of collaboration.
Not surprisingly, the network formation situation of the ﬁrst stage satisﬁes positive
externalities because other agents’ cooperations lower their costs, increase their optimal
14Agent i’s cost of producing the output is fi(xi,g) = 1
2( xi
di(g)+1)2. Fixing the number of collaborators





di(g)+1)2 =: F(x). This yields F0(x) = 0 ⇐⇒ x∗
i = (di(g)+1)2. Then, plugging in the optimal output
(F(x∗)) for any agent into the objective function and subtracting the linking costs yields the utility of
one agent.
10output and, hence, is beneﬁcial to all. To see this, observe that the addition of foreign
links increases the middle term of the utility function. Note that in this example the
externalities are strict in the sense that the addition of any link in any network increases
the utility of all agents that are not involved. Moreover, given these speciﬁc functional
forms, u satisﬁes concavity. Thus, the two results (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) imply
again that no stable network can be over-connected.




2(n−1)2 =: lb such that the complete network is stable.
By the results (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2) above, the complete network must also be
eﬃcient for these costs. In fact, since the externalities are strict, there exists an ￿ > 0 such
that gN is eﬃcient for c ≤ lb+￿. The tension can be illustrated for lb < c < lb+￿. In this
cost range the complete network would still be eﬃcient. However, the stable networks are
not complete.
The model can be interpreted as a doubled public goods problem. In the second stage there
is the classic public goods problem, where individual output xi is chosen “too low” (from
a collective perspective). This problem persists, but in addition (in the ﬁrst stage) players
tend to choose “too few” links reducing the cost of provision, such that the outcome is even
worse. In the same manner any network formation situation with positive externalities
can be interpreted as a public goods problem. Utility maximizing agents simply do not
internalize the positive eﬀects that establishing a bilateral link means for other agents.
4 Negative Externalities
Negative externalities in network formation occur, when any addition of a link cannot be
beneﬁcial for the players which are not involved in this link. Formally, we speak of weakly
negative externalities (further denoted as negative externalities) if the following holds:
Deﬁnition 8. A proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes negative externalities if ∀g ∈
G,∀ij / ∈ g,∀k ∈ N \ {i,j} it holds that
uk(g ∪ ij) ≤ uk(g).
When considering negative externalities in economics, equilibrium analysis usually shows
that individuals do rather “too much” (pollute, etc.) than being socially optimal. In that
sense it is intuitive to think about “too dense” networks as being stable. For stability
only individual incentives are considered and not the overall welfare. Network formation
games with negative externalities are thus expected to be over-connected, and not under-
connected. While the intuition points into the direction of rather “too dense” networks as
being stable, the bilateral nature of link formation does not necessarily exclude pairwise
stable networks from being under-connected. As discussed above any player has the
power to deny links.15 Although the concept of pairwise stability already solves some
miscoordination problems that arise in the bilateral network formation of the Myerson
game, it might happen that a player rejects a link that is highly beneﬁcial to the proposing
15In section 5 when introducing a general framework that is not restricted to bilateral and unweighted
network formation we treat this as a property of the outcome function, which we call rejection power.
11player. This link, however, could potentially lead to higher welfare, which we aim to
exclude.
A simple way out of this issue is using the stability concept “Pairwise Stability with
transfers” [PSt]. This concept helps ensure that any single link that is not in a network
g, which is pairwise stable with transfers, cannot be welfare improving. Analogously to
our results on positive externalities, we require concavity (see Deﬁnition 7) for our main
result on negative externalities to ensure that no set of links can be welfare improving.
Utility functions satisfying this property imply that networks, which are pairwise stable
with transfers are not under-connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function:
Theorem 3. Suppose a proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes negative externalities and
concavity, then no network g ∈ G, which is pairwise stable with transfers, is under-
connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
As usual the proof can be found in the appendix. Pairwise stability with transfers diﬀers
from pairwise stability signiﬁcantly. In general, neither [PS(u)] ⊆ [PSt(u)] nor [PS(u)] ⊇
[PSt(u)]. The concept of pairwise stability with transfers rather stems from a game, in
which players can pay transfers to make others willing to build a link. Formally, pairwise
stability with transfers has been introduced in Bloch and Jackson (2007). Although the
concepts diﬀer, we can easily ﬁnd properties of the utility function that are suﬃcient to
ensure equivalence of both stability concepts. Intuitively, both concepts should coincide
if for any link the gains or losses for both involved individuals coincide. This is the case
in network formation games that have potential function.16 The property that we need
in order to show equivalence of the concepts, however, only requires individuals to either
both gain or lose from a link. The following deﬁnition taken from Chakrabarti and Gilles
(2007) formalizes this intuition:
Deﬁnition 9. A proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes pairwise sign compatibility (PSC),
if for all g ∈ G and for all links ij ∈ g it holds, that:
sgn(mui(g,ij)) = sgn(muj(g,ij))
Pairwise sign compatibility requires any two players to either both gain, both lose or
both be indiﬀerent from a mutual link in any network. Under this condition the power
to deny any link does not play a role, since any rational denial of a link by one player
implies that the link is not beneﬁcial for both involved players. In particular no transfer
of utility would make sense in a network, that is already pairwise stable, and conversely if
no transfer for any link is beneﬁcial, then no addition or deletion of a link is beneﬁcial for
either player, meaning that the network is pairwise stable. Thus, both stability concepts
coincide and we get:
Theorem 4. Suppose that a proﬁle of utility functions satisﬁes PSC. Then,
[PS(u)] = [PS
t(u)].
As a consequence of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 it is obvious that under PSC, concavity
and negative externalities, no pairwise stable network can be under-connected.
16For a study of network potentials, see Chakrabarti and Gilles (2007).
12Corollary 1. Suppose that a proﬁle of utility functions satisﬁes negative externalities,
PSC and concavity in own links. Then, no network g which is pairwise stable is under-
connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
The proof is an immediate implication of Theorem 3 and Theorem 4 and thus is omitted.
For both results we can restrict the domain of networks for which the assumptions have
to hold resembling Remark 1.
Remark 2. Suppose u satisﬁes negative externalities and concavity on a domain ˜ G ⊆ G,
such that for all g ∈ ˜ G it holds that [g,gN] ⊆ ˜ G. Then no g ∈ ˜ G, which is pairwise
stable with transfers is under-connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
If u additionally satisﬁes PSC on ˜ g, then no pairwise stable network is under-connected
with respect to the utilitarian welfare function.
The remark is shown in the appendix. It becomes very handy when analyzing network
formation games that fulﬁll the properties of Theorem 3 only on a certain domain ˜ G. We
will see examples of network formation games such that the utility function is concave
only for networks such that all players have at least one link,17 and it is straightforward
to see that for such a set of networks ¯ G := {g ∈ G|di(g) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ N} it holds that
g ∈ ¯ G ⇒ [g,gN] ⊆ ¯ G. Another example of a domain of networks for which the above
property is satisﬁed is the set of connected networks.18
We require pairwise stability with transfers or the pairwise sign compatibility for our
result, since it is a way to limit the gain of one of the two players from a potential mutual
link. Without assuming pairwise sign compatibility or transfers, we need to compare the
sum of utilities of non-involved players to the sum of utilities of involved players for any
new link to exclude large gains and thus stable networks from being under-connected. If
we cannot exclude possible gains from additional links in pairwise stable networks, we
may, however, ask whether a pairwise stable network is not Pareto under-connected, that
is whether there does not exists a Pareto better supernetwork.
Deﬁnition 10. A network g ∈ G is Pareto under-connected if there exists a network
g0 ⊃ g, such that ui(g0) ≥ ui(g) for all i ∈ N, and there exists a j ∈ N such that
uj(g0) > uj(g).
To exclude Pareto under-connectedness, the following deﬁnition of transitivity is needed:
Deﬁnition 11. A utility function satisﬁes transitivity of negative (positive) marginal
utility in new links for g ∈ G if for all ij, jk / ∈ g the following holds:
mui(g,ij) < (>)0, muj(g,jk) < (>)0 ⇒ mui(g,ik) < (>)0.
This deﬁnition captures the idea of transitivity: if player A does not want to connect
to B and B does not want to connect to C, then A does not want to connect to C.
The following Theorem presents the result that no pairwise stable network can be Pareto
under-connected.
17The model of free-trade agreements satisﬁes concavity only for networks such each players degree is
at least one.
18The set of connected networks is formally deﬁned as Gcon := {g ∈ G | ∀i,j ∈ N, dij(g) < ∞}.
13Theorem 5. Suppose a proﬁle of utility functions satisﬁes negative externalities, and
concavity. If g is pairwise stable and u satisﬁes transitivity of negative marginal utility
for g, then g cannot be Pareto under-connected.
In the proof of the result, we need the transitivity property in order to exclude the case
that a set of links l can be added to a pairwise stable network such that each involved
individual has at least two links in l. This set of links can be potentially beneﬁcial, if
for each player one link is highly beneﬁcial (and thus a loss for the other players) and
compensates for the loss of other links (which could mean gains for the other players,
which are involved). The property of transitivity, however, is only needed locally, that is
it is only needed for pairwise stable networks. It could thus also be seen as a stability
reﬁnement.
Degree Dependent Utility Functions
A lot of applications and examples of network formation games with negative externalities
can be found under what we call “degree dependent utility functions”. For instance, Goyal
and Joshi (2006a) present network formation models, where the utility functions depend
only on the number of own links, the number of links of neighbors and on the number of
links of non-neighbors. They analyze two diﬀerent models:
• Playing the ﬁeld:
u
PF















Here g−i represents the network, obtained by deleting player i and all his links and
D(g) =
P
i∈N di(g). The ﬁrst utility function, playing the ﬁeld, presented by Goyal and
Joshi (2006a) features a very speciﬁc structure in that each utility does not depend on
network positions, but rather on the number of own and the sum of all other players’ links.
In contrast, the local spillover utility function includes a little bit more of the network
structure. Here, neighborhood distribution of links matters. In the playing the ﬁeld case,
players do not care to whom to connect, they are not able to distinguish between diﬀerent
players, whereas in the local spillover case, players are able to distinguish between players
and might have preferences of whom to connect to. For the following we will generalize
both cases and try to shed some light on the tension between stability and eﬃciency when
considering the following utility function:
Deﬁnition 12. A proﬁle of utility functions is called homogeneous degree dependent utility
function if for all i ∈ N there exist function f : Rn → R such that:
u
DD













14This utility function captures both the local spillovers function and the playing the ﬁeld
function, as well as other examples. The distinction between neighbors and non-neighbors
is only made for illustration since in a lot of examples those degrees are treated diﬀerently.







For the analysis of both playing the ﬁeld and general degree dependent utility functions,
we focus on the case of negative externalities, since the tension between eﬃciency and
pairwise stability seems to be suﬃciently covered in section 3. In contrast the case of
negative externalities requires the properties transfers or pairwise sign compatibility in
order to show the result.
In the playing the ﬁeld case, negative externalities imply that uPF is decreasing in its
second argument, i.e. uPF(l,k+1)−uPF(l,k) ≤ 0 for all l = {0,...,n−1}, k = {0,...,n−2}.
General degree dependent utility functions satisfy negative externalities if for all i ∈ N,
for all di ∈ {0,...,n − 1}, and for all d−i, ˜ d−i ∈ {0,...,n − 1}n−1 such that ˜ dk ≥ dk for all
k ∈ N \ {i}, the following holds:
u
DD
i (di,d−i) ≥ u
DD
i (di, ˜ d−i).
For the special cases of degree dependent utility functions, the results of section 4 carry
over and some assumptions are automatically satisﬁed. For playing the ﬁeld utility func-
tions, it becomes immediately clear from (2), that uPF satisﬁes our notion of transitivity
for all g ∈ G because either a player wants a link to any remaining player or to none. Thus
the transitivity condition of Theorem 5 is satisﬁed, and we get the following corollary :
Corollary 2. Suppose that the proﬁle of utility functions of a network formation game
is given by (2), and uPF satisﬁes negative externalities and concavity. Then no pairwise
stable network g is Pareto under-connected.
Due to the special structure and homogeneity of the utility functions given by (2) and (3),
it is often observed that regular networks are pairwise stable, i.e. feature equal degree
distributions.19 Since the utility functions given by (4) are homogeneous, regular pairwise
stable networks are also pairwise stable with transfers. This is true since no single player
wants to add or cut a link in regular pairwise stable networks. Furthermore, the star is
a common observed stable network. In the star, n − 1 players share equal degree, and
the other player is completely connected, and cannot add any links. Thus, the same
considerations hold for the star. These observations lead to the following result:
Corollary 3. Suppose that the proﬁle of utility functions is given by (4) and, furthermore,
satisﬁes negative externalities and concavity. Then, no regular pairwise stable network is
under-connected. Moreover if the star is pairwise stable, then it is not under-connected.
The corollary also holds for playing the ﬁeld and local spillover utility functions since
degree based utility functions satisfying (4) contain these two cases.
Applications of degree dependent utility functions can be found plenty. Among those are
the provision of a public good and the market sharing agreements presented in section 3,
19See Goyal and Joshi (2006a) for a detailed analysis of stable networks in playing the ﬁeld and local
spillover games.
15but also there are several examples for negative externalities, of which we present some
below.
The Co-author Model
The co-author model has been introduced by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) in their seminal
paper and describes the utility of joint work. The nodes of the network are interpreted
as researchers, who spend time writing papers. A link between two researchers i and j
represents a collaboration between both researchers. The amount of time a researcher
spends on a project is inversely related to the number of projects he is involved in. The



























i (g) = 0 if di = 0. The utility depends only on own degree and neighbors
degree and thus is degree dependent. Obviously, the functional form satisﬁes negative
externalities as the utility of players decrease, when neighbors are adding links, i.e.
increasing their degree. From Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we get that if n is even,
then any eﬃcient network consists of n/2 separate pairs. Any pairwise stable network,
however, can be partitioned into fully intra-connected components, each of which has a
diﬀerent number of members (if m is the number of members of one such component and
k is the next largest size, then m > k2).
We can add to this result that none of the stable networks contains a singleton component
since each player is better oﬀ connecting to some player than to none, and each player i
wants a link to a player j, for whom dj ≤ di. For n being even it is clear, that any pairwise
stable network contains an eﬃcient network, since any network consisting of n/2 separate
pairs is eﬃcient. For n being odd, any network that consists of (n − 2)/2 separate pairs
and three players, which are connected by 2 links, is eﬃcient. We can show that also in
the case of n being odd that any pairwise stable network contains an eﬃcient network,
implying over-connected pairwise stable network.
Proposition 1. In the co-author model if n ≥ 3, then any pairwise stable network is
over-connected.
The proof is straightforward and uses the result of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) component-
wise (for any completely connected component of the pairwise stable networks). It is
welfare better for any component of at least size three to be connected like one of the
eﬃcient networks. Thus any component of any pairwise stable network contains a welfare
better subcomponent, implying that any pairwise stable network contains a welfare better
subnetwork.
16Patent Races
Goyal and Joshi (2006a) derive this model as a variation of the classical patent race
model.20 In addition to the classical model, ﬁrms can join R&D collaborations to acceler-
ate research. The ﬁrst ﬁrm to develop the new product is awarded a patent. The random
time τ(li(g)) at which the innovation happens is given by
Pr({τ(di(g)) ≤ t}) = 1 − exp(−di(g)t).
Assuming risk neutrality, payoﬀ of 1 in case of receiving the patent and 0 else, and a
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ρ + 2di(g) + D(g−i)
− di(g)c.
This model is thus a playing the ﬁeld utility function. Moreover, it satisﬁes negative
externalities since links of other ﬁrms reduce the probability to innovate ﬁrstly. Also,
since uPR
i is a concave function of di(g), it is concave according to Deﬁnition 7. From
Theorem 3 we can thus conclude that no pairwise stable network with transfers is under-
connected. In fact, it is straightforward to calculate the eﬃcient networks since the



















In this case the utilitarian welfare only depends on the total number of links and thus
any network that contains the optimal number of total links is eﬃcient. The distribution
of links and the structure of the network do not matter for eﬃciency. We can easily
calculate that for
ρ
(ρ+2(k+1))(ρ+2k) < c <
ρ
(ρ+2k)(ρ+2(k−1)) any network which contains k links
is eﬃcient and no other networks are eﬃcient.
It requires a little bit more to characterize stable networks. However, for this matter we
can apply Theorem 3 in order to bound the total number of links.
Proposition 2. Suppose that
ρ
(ρ+2k+2)(ρ+2k) < c, then all networks g, which are pairwise
stable with transfers, have to contain more than k total links, in other words D(g) ≥ 2k.
In their paper, Goyal and Joshi (2006a) only ﬁnd a partial characterization for the set
of pairwise stable networks. By applying Theorem 3 we were able to contribute to their
characterization. This example shows that Theorem 3 not only describes the tension
between stability and eﬃciency, but it can also be applied to characterize the stable
networks (resp. the eﬃcient ones).
20See Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) among others.
17Free Trade Agreements
This model has been introduced by Goyal and Joshi (2006b). We analyze the most basic
setup here. In this example there are n countries. In each country there is one ﬁrm
producing a homogeneous good. The ﬁrm may sell the product in the domestic market
as well as in foreign markets. If two countries do not have a free trade agreement (FTA)
the importing country charges tariﬀs. Given a conﬁguration of FTA’s the ﬁrms then
compete in each market by choosing quantities. We denote the quantity output of ﬁrm
j in country i by Q
j
i. In each country i ∈ N, a ﬁrm faces an identical inverse demand




i, and α > 0. All ﬁrms have a constant and
identical marginal cost of production, α > γ > 0. In the basic model, linear demand and
identical tariﬀs are assumed. Forming an FTA lowers the tariﬀ to 0. Assuming high tariﬀs
T > α, ﬁrm i sells in country j if and only if there is a FTA between the two countries,




The utility function of country i is given by its “social welfare” derived as the sum of








































Again, this utility function is degree dependent. Moreover, it is straightforward to see
that uFTA satisﬁes negative externalities. To see the reasoning for negative externalities,
suppose a free trade partner j of country i signs a free trade agreement with country
k. Then ﬁrm k will enter market j and thus reduces the Cournot output of ﬁrm i,
lowering the country’s welfare function. If two non-trade partners of i sign a free trade
agreement, then i’s payoﬀ remains unaﬀected. Straightforward calculations show that
uFTA
i satisﬁes concavity whenever di ≥ 1. From Goyal and Joshi (2006b) we get the
following characterization of stability and eﬃciency:
Proposition 3. (Goyal and Joshi, 2006b) The complete network is a stable trading
network. Furthermore, a network such that one component has n − 1 countries and is
complete and the other component is a single country can be stable. However, the complete
network is uniquely eﬃcient.
In this case, the network such that there is one component with n − 1 countries and
one unconnected country is under-connected. It can be shown, that this network is also
pairwise stable with transfers if n is suﬃciently large. These networks however, do not
fall in the restricted domain in Remark 2 since concavity only holds for uFTA
i if di ≥ 1.
Thus Remark 2 only applies to all g ∈ ˜ G such that ˜ G := {g ∈ G | di(g) ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ N},
and hence does not exclude the case of under-connected pairwise stable networks g / ∈ ˜ G.
185 Extensions
So far, we have only considered undirected and unweighted networks. In this section we
relax those assumptions by providing a general framework for the formation of networks
and generalizing our main results. Particularly, our framework captures models of directed
network formation including those in Bala and Goyal (2000) and models of weighted
network formation of Bloch and Dutta (2005) and Rogers (2006). We show in this very
general setup that we are able to reestablish the results discussed above. Moreover, by
considering Nash stable networks, the statements get stronger.
5.1 Framework
As before, let N be a set of agents. In the following we deﬁne a network g to be a
n × n-matrix [gij]i,j∈N, where an entry gij ∈ R is the weight of the relation from agent i
to agent j. In the context of directed networks gij stands for the intensity/strength of the
link ~ ij which is diﬀerent from the link ~ ji. In the context of undirected networks gij = gji
is interpreted as the intensity of the link ij. Unweighted networks are represented by
gij ∈ {0,1} for all i,j ∈ N, where the intensity 0 or 1 indicates whether a link is present.
A loop (or self-link) gii 6= 0 may stand for the resources (e.g. time, money) devoted to
oneself. A negative tie gij < 0 incorporates a negative relation, such as being enemies.
Let G := {[gij]i,j∈N|gij ∈ R} be the set of all n×n-matrices. We will restrict this domain
according to the application in mind. For example G, the set of networks we considered
in the sections above, can be written as a subset of G.21 Each player has a preference
ordering over the set of networks, which we represent by a utility function ui : G → R.
Let us now generalize Myerson’s link announcement game.
A Generalized Link Announcement Game
Consider the following game form (N,S,Ψ) where N is the set of players as above, Si := Rn
is player i’s strategy set and Ψ : S → G is an outcome rule mapping strategy proﬁles
into networks. The strategy set of each player is interpreted as intensities that a player
can announce for the relationship with another player. We will also sometimes refer to
strategies as an eﬀort that player i invests into the relationship with j. The outcome
rule Ψ deﬁnes how individual strategies translate into network links. In virtually any
model, the intensity gij is only dependent on sij and sji and it does not decrease, ceteris
paribus, with an increase in one of those. Therefore, we will assume for the following that
Ψ is fully described by a function ψ that translates individual eﬀorts into link strengths,
gij = ψ(sij,sji), where ψ is non-decreasing function in both arguments.22
Consider the following examples of outcome rules, which lead to a reformulation of well-
21In particular, G = {g ∈ G : gii = 0,∀i ∈ N; gij = gji ∈ {0,1},∀i,j ∈ N} is the set of undirected
unweighted networks without loops.
22This assumption restricts outcome rules such that the intensity gij cannot be determined by the
strategy of some player k 6∈ {i,j}. Of course, that does not hinder agents from interacting strategically.
19known models from the literature:
I) gij = ψ(sij,sji) =
(
1 if i 6= j and min{sij,sji} ≥ 1
0 else
. Since link strength is either
0 or 1, this models the formation of unweighted networks. Moreover, networks
are undirected because ψ(sij,sji) = ψ(sji,sij). Finally, the networks may not
exhibit loops because gii = 0 ∀i ∈ N. Thus, we are in the context of unweighted
undirected networks without loops. In fact, this is a reformulation of Myerson’s link
announcement game, also called the Consent Game. Strategies in this model are
simply interpreted as players announcing the links they desire, i.e. sij ≥ 1, while
links are only formed if the two involved players agree about it.
II) gij = ψ(sij,sji) = φ(sij) + φ(sji) ∈ [0,1]. This outcome rule allows to form
undirected networks with link intensities in the interval [0,1]. Individual eﬀorts
are perfect substitutes. Such a model for the formation of undirected weighted
networks can be found in Bloch and Dutta (2005) (see “Assumption 1”).
III) gij = ψ(sij,sji) = φ(min{sij,sji}) ∈ [0,1]. This outcome rule captures the second
model of Bloch and Dutta (2005) (see “Assumption 2”). It models the formation of
undirected weighted networks, where individual eﬀorts are perfect complements.
IV) gij = ψ(sij,sji) =
(
1 if i 6= j and sij ≥ 1
0 else
. With this outcome rule link strength
can only be 0 or 1, modeling the formation of an unweighted network. Moreover, gij
need not be equal to gji such that the networks are directed. The models in Bala
and Goyal (2000) belong to this class.23
V) gij = ψ(sij,sji) = φ(sij) ∈ R+.24 This outcome rule models the formation of undi-
rected networks which are weighted. Here, the intensity of any link is determined by
the strategy of a single player. Speciﬁcally, any player can determine his outgoing
links. A model of this type can be found in Rogers (2006) (see “Model A”).
VI) gij = ψ(sij,sji) = φ(sji) ∈ R+. This outcome rule captures the second model
of Rogers (2006) (see “Model G”). It models the formation of directed weighted
networks, where any player can determine his incoming links.
As the examples show, a choice of outcome rule determines the set of feasible networks
in a model, GΨ := {g ∈ G|∃s ∈ S : Ψ(s) = g}. This completes the generalized
society (N,GΨ,u). The six examples of outcome rules incorporate models of weighted
and unweighted, directed and undirected networks, but do not cover loops or negative
links. Such models, although reasonable, can hardly be found in the literature. To
complete the deﬁnition of a non-cooperative game Γ = (N,S,uΨ), we assume that the
payoﬀs uΨ : S → Rn are deﬁned by the network utility function function u evaluating the
induced network, uΨ(s) := u(Ψ(s)).
23Not only the one-way ﬂow model, but also the two-way ﬂow model is formalized as a directed network
here because the utility of an agent does not only depend on the undirected links established, but also
on who initiated them.
24Here φ may be speciﬁed according to the application in mind.
20Now, we can make use of the well-established solution concepts for non-cooperative games.






−i,si). This leads to a basic notion of stability for a generalized society
(N,GΨ,u).
Deﬁnition 13. A network g is Nash stable (NS) if it can be supported by a Nash equi-
librium in the corresponding link formation game Γ; formally, g ∈ [NS(u)] if and only if
∃s ∈ S such that s is a Nash equilibrium in Γ and Ψ(s) = g.
Several other notions of stability are reasonable. In particular, Nash stability is too weak
for a reasonable stability concept in the Consent Game (outcome rule I) because, due to
coordination problems, any network where no player wants to cut links is Nash stable.
But, since the notion of Nash equilibrium is so weak, the results we present for Nash
stable networks are strong as they hold for any reﬁnement of Nash stability.
Note that the way we represent the examples of models above is not identical to their
introduction in the literature. We embedded them into our framework without keeping
the original notation and in the various models φ is further speciﬁed, e.g. to be concave,
convex, satisfy φ(0) = 0, etc. More importantly, we work with the strategy sets of the
form Si = RN in any model. While this might lead to much more Nash equilibria in the
space of strategy proﬁles, it does not lead to more Nash stable networks in the outcome
space. For instance, in the original formulation of the Consent Game, strategy sets are
{0,1}, while in our formulation (outcome rule I) a player can announce any real number
above 1 to initiate a link. However, the outcome rule is speciﬁed such that the set of
networks GΨ is identical to the set of possible networks of the Consent Game in Myerson
(1991), which we denoted by G in the former sections. Moreover, in the models of Rogers
(2006) and Bloch and Dutta (2005) strategies are restricted. For example, Rogers (2006)
introduces a budget constraint βi for every agent such that
P
j∈N sij ≤ βi, while sii = 0.
Similar assumptions are made in Bloch and Dutta (2005). We will address this aspect
below.
Some notation for a Generalized Situation of Network Formation
Consider a generalized society (N,GΨ,u). For GΨ, the set of feasible networks depending
on the outcome rule Ψ, we can deﬁne similar operations as in Section 2. We call a matrix
g0 a subnetwork (supernetwork) of a network g(∈ GΨ), denoted as g0 < (=)g, if it belongs
to the set of feasible networks g0 ∈ GΨ and all entries in the matrix are smaller (larger)
or equal, g0
ij ≤ (≥)gij,∀i,j ∈ N. Similarly, we denote g0 <i g if g is a subnetwork of g0
that diﬀers only in links involving i, i.e. g0 <i g if and only if g0 < g and g0
kl < gkl implies
that i ∈ {k,l}.
In a given network, players may increase or decrease intensities of links. We use the
following notation: For g ∈ GΨ and δ ∈ R we denote by g +ij δ the matrix [g0
kl]k,l∈N with
g0
kl = gkl ∀(k,l) 6= (i,j) and g0
ij = gij + δ, which means that the intensity of the link ~ ij
is increased by δ. This deﬁnition is only meaningful if the operation gij + δ is feasible,
that is if g0 ∈ GΨ.25 In the context of undirected networks, each change of link strength
25For instance, Ψ has to present an outcome rule that allows for directed networks.
21has consequences for two entries in the matrix which deﬁnes the network. Therefore, we
deﬁne the following operation: For g ∈ GΨ and δ ∈ R we denote by g ∓ij δ the matrix
[g0
kl]k,l∈N with g0
kl = gkl ∀{k,l} 6= {i,j} and g0
ij = gij + δ and g0
ji = gji + δ, which means
that the intensity of link ij is increased by δ. Both operations coincide for changes of
loop intensities, i.e. g +ii δ = g ∓ii δ.
The deﬁnitions of eﬃciency in Section 2 carry over from a society (N,G,u) to a generalized
society (N,GΨ,u), only the domain has to be adapted. In brief, a welfare function w :
Rn → R satisﬁes monotonicity if ui(g) ≥ ui(g0) ∀i ∈ N =⇒ w(u(g)) ≥ w(u(g0)).
Moreover, a network g is called over-connected (under-connected) with respect to the
welfare function w if ∃g0 < (=)g such that w(u(g0)) > w(u(g)).
To organize our discussion of the general model, we distinguish between unilateral and
bilateral network formation. Network formation is bilateral if a link gij is determined
by both agent i and agent j. Network formation is unilateral if an agent is in control
of “his” links. Considering the examples of outcome rules above, examples I,II, and III
incorporate bilateral network formation, while outcome rules IV, V, and VI incorporate
unilateral network formation. In principle it is also possible to have a model with bilateral
formation of directed links.26 However, we do not consider this unnatural case in the next
two subsections.
5.2 Bilateral Network Formation
In this section we focus entirely on the bilateral formation of undirected networks. Thus,
a link ij is described by its strength gij = gji, which is jointly determined by the players i
and j, ψ(sij,sji) = gij = gji. Considering the examples of outcome rules above, examples
I, II, and III belong to this class of models. In fact, all models we discuss in Section 3 and
4, are examples for bilateral network formation and can be formulated as a Consent Game
(outcome rule I). Consistently, the notions of stability we use there, i.e. pairwise stability
and pairwise stability with transfers, incorporate bilateral network formation. Now, we
want to extend those results to the framework that allows for weighted links, loops and
negative links, in addition. For this purpose, let us rewrite the deﬁnitions of externalities
(Deﬁnition 6 and 8):
Deﬁnition 14. A proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes positive (negative) externalities in
bilateral network formation if ∀g ∈ GΨ,∀i,j ∈ N,∀δ > 0 : g∓ijδ ∈ GΨ and ∀k ∈ N\{i,j}
it holds that
uk(g ∓
ij δ) ≥ (≤)uk(g).
In words: If agents i and j increase the intensity of their link (gij and gji), then a player
k not involved in this link does not loose (gain) utility. In bilateral network formation
players usually have the power to deny links. This is a basic idea in the notion of pairwise
stability and it is also true for models based on the outcome rules I and III above. Let us
formally deﬁne this property:
Deﬁnition 15. An outcome rule Ψ satisﬁes rejection power if ∀g,g0 ∈ GΨ : g0 <i g , it
holds that ∀s ∈ Ψ−1(g), there exists s0
i ∈ Si such that Ψ(s−i,s0
i) = g0.
26Note that an outcome rule allowing for a domain of only undirected links cannot be unilateral.
22In words: Given a network and a subnetwork that only diﬀer in the intensity of links
involving agent i, for any strategy proﬁle inducing the ﬁrst network, i is able to deviate in
order to reach the latter. Simply put, player i is able to deny any intensity that another
player proposes toward him.27 Theorem 1 makes a statement about the bilateral formation
of unweighted networks, when positive externalities are satisﬁed, using the requirement of
pairwise stability. With the property of rejection power, we are able to restate this result
for general situations of bilateral network formation:
Theorem 6. Let an outcome rule Ψ satisfy rejection power. If a proﬁle of utility func-
tions u satisﬁes positive externalities in bilateral network formation, then no Nash stable
network g ∈ GΨ is over-connected with respect to any monotonic welfare function w.
Thus reducing the intensity of any set of links in a Nash stable network does not increase
the utility of any player. In the special case of unweighted networks (without loops),
Theorem 6 has the same implications as Theorem 1 does. In contrast to Theorem 1,
it does not need the concavity assumption, but makes a statement about Nash stability
instead of pairwise stability. The two concepts do not stand in a simple relation – in
general neither [NS(u)] ⊆ [PS(u)] nor [PS(u)] ⊆ [NS(u)] holds. More precisely, the
property of concavity we need for Theorem 1 is suﬃcient for [PS(u)] ⊆ [NS(u)] (as
shown in Calv´ o-Armengol and Ilkili¸ c, 2007). Both notions share many reﬁnements. One
prominent example is the concept of pairwise Nash stability (PNS), also called pairwise
equilibrium (Goyal and Joshi, 2006a), which simply incorporates the properties of both
Nash equilibrium and pairwise stable networks, [PNS(u)] := [NS(u)]∩[PS(u)] (see, e.g.,
Bloch and Jackson, 2006). Since pairwise Nash stability is a reﬁnement of Nash stability,
we get a direct corollary: If the conditions of Theorem 6 are met, then no pairwise Nash
stable network is over-connected w.r.t. any monotonic welfare function.
In Section 3 we presented several examples of unweighted network formation where the
results of Theorem 1 and Theorem 6 apply. Besides the examples of unweighted networks,
the models of Bloch and Dutta (2005) using outcome rule III satisfy rejection power and
positive externalities. The fact that they formulate their model with a budget constraint
does not contradict the property of rejection power that we need. Thus, Theorem 6 does
apply. However, in this speciﬁc example it is not surprising that no Nash stable network
can be socially improved by the addition of links because the utility functions are such
that no network can be improved by the deletion of links, ceteris paribus. The focus of
this model – the allocation of eﬀort between diﬀerent links facing a budget constraint – is
not addressed by our result. However, Bloch and Dutta (2005) mention that an interesting
variation of their model would be to replace budget constraints by linking costs. Then the
individual decisions are not restricted to the allocation of link intensity, but also determine
the total amount of link intensity. For such a model our result implies that agents rather
under-invest, but surely never over-invest in link intensities due to positive externalities.
A corresponding result to Theorem 6 can be formulated for negative externalities if an
outcome rule satisﬁes some other type of power. Speciﬁcally, we need the property that
any player can add intensity to any of his links, despite the action of the other player
27This property is the special feature of the Consent Game, where both players have to propose a link
to have it formed. Similarly, outcome rule III taken from Bloch and Dutta (2005) is based on the minimal
intensities announced such that rejection power is satisﬁed.
23involved (the power to form links at free will). One example would be an outcome rule
that is based on the maximal eﬀort gij = ψ(sij,sji) = max{sij,sji}. However, it is not
clear in which settings this would be a natural assumption.
5.3 Unilateral Network Formation
Any result so far has concerned undirected links. We ﬁnish this paper with a short analysis
of the unilateral formation of directed links. Typically, in the formation of directed
networks (weighted or unweighted) it is a reasonable assumption that each player is in
control of his outgoing links, thus a link ~ ij with strength gij is determined by player i,
gij = ψ(sij).
Among the outcome rules we mentioned, rules IV and V belong to this setting. Outcome
rule VI is a special case of unilateral network formation, where agents are in control of
their incoming links. Such a model can be easily rewritten to ﬁt into this subsection by
changing the role of outgoing and incoming links in the utility function.
Since unilateral network formation does not need any input from the player to whom the
link is formed, it is reasonable to reformulate the notion of externalities.
Deﬁnition 16. A proﬁle of utility functions u satisﬁes positive (negative) externalities
in unilateral network formation, if ∀g ∈ GΨ,∀(i,j) ∈ N × N,∀δ > 0 : g +ij δ ∈ GΨ and
∀k ∈ N \ {i}, it holds that
uk(g +
ij δ) ≥ (≤)uk(g).
In words, positive externalities mean that if a player increases the intensity of one of
his outgoing links, then no other player’s utility decreases. Here externalities include
the player for whom the incoming link has changed, except if the intensity of a loop
is changed (g +ii δ). Nash stability is a concept of unilateral deviations. In models of
unilateral network formation, we do not need further assumptions to generally characterize
the relation between Nash stability and eﬃciency of directed networks.
Theorem 7. Let an outcome rule be unilateral gij = ψ(sij). If a proﬁle of utility functions
u satisﬁes positive (negative) externalities in unilateral network formation, then no Nash
stable network is over-connected (under-connected) with respect to any monotonic welfare
function w.
In words: Given a Nash stable network g. In any subnetwork g0 < g, any player is weakly
worse oﬀ, ui(g0) ≤ ui(g).
Consider ﬁrst the model “A” by Rogers (2006), i.e. outcome rule V. He uses a utility
function of the type ui(g) = αi +
P
j∈N(αj + vj) ∗ gij, where each player’s utility is
recursively deﬁned as the sum of an intrinsic value αi and the value derived from other
agents vi, which is again a sum of intrinsic value and derived value. In this model there
is no tension between stability and eﬃciency. As Jackson (2008) points out, this relies
on several assumptions. Most importantly, Rogers (2006) works with a budget constraint
restricting the players choices of how much intensity to “invest” in social relationships.
Thus, the eﬃciency result tells us that the decisions about the allocation of link intensities
24are eﬃcient. This need not be true for decisions about the amount of intensities if we
allow players to decide upon them. Therefore, as in the model of Bloch and Dutta (2005),
an interesting variation of Roger’s model would be to incorporate linking costs instead of
capacity constraints. In such a model, positive externalities are still satisﬁed since linking
costs are internalized. Thus, Theorem 7 implies the ineﬃcient outcomes of such a model
are improvable by increasing the intensity of some links, but never by decreasing some
intensities.
Now, consider the set of unweighted directed networks, {g ∈ G : gii = 0,∀i ∈ N;
gij ∈ {0,1},∀i,j ∈ N}. Examples for the formation of such networks can be found
in Bala and Goyal (2000) (see outcome rule IV). They extensively analyze four models
that are called one-way ﬂow model and two-way ﬂow model with or without decay. Let
us quickly discuss the interpretation of our result for those models. For concreteness,
consider the one-way ﬂow model without decay (OW-model). By i ￿ j we denote that
there exists a directed path from agent i to agent j in a network g, that is a sequence of
distinct agents i0,i1,...,iT such that i0 = i, iT = j and ∀t ∈ {0,...,T − 1} it holds that
git,it+1 = 1. Let µi(g) := #{j 6= i : i ￿ j}. Then the one-way ﬂow model is deﬁned as
uOW
i (g) = φ(µi(g),di(g)), where φ is increasing in the ﬁrst and decreasing in the second
argument. Thus, agents face a trade-oﬀ between maintaining costly (outgoing) links and
receiving beneﬁts of connections (via outgoing paths).
All four models satisfy positive externalities in unilateral network formation. Clearly,
establishing a link ~ ij in the OW-model means for some passive player k ∈ N \{i} that his
number of outgoing links dk(g) has not changed, while his number of connections µk(g)
might increase. Bala and Goyal (2000) ﬁnd a large number of Nash stable networks (more
than 20,000 for n = 6), but only a few of them (two) are strict Nash equilibria. Theorem 7
directly implies that deletion of links in one of the Nash stable networks cannot make any
player better oﬀ. In any of the four models, the empty network ~ g∅ := [0]i,j∈N is Nash
stable for quite a parameter range, i.e. for φ(x + 1,x) < φ(1,0) ∀x ∈ {0,...,n − 1} in the
OW-model. However, there might be other Nash stable networks for those parameters,
e.g. the wheel network if φ(n,1) > φ(1,0) is satisﬁed in addition. Since the empty network
is a subnetwork of any other network, Theorem 7 implies that the stable networks have at
least as high welfare as the empty network. In the particular case of the OW-model with
φ(n,1) > φ(1,0), the wheel network is uniquely eﬃcient according to utilitarian welfare,
as Bala and Goyal (2000) show.
In this model, as in the three other models, there is also some parameter range where the
empty network is uniquely eﬃcient, i.e. for φ(n,1) < φ(1,0). As a trivial implication of
Theorem 7, we can conclude that there is no tension (between stability and eﬃciency)
in such a setting because any non-empty network is over-connected and thus must be
unstable. In fact, Bala and Goyal (2000) show that myopic best-response dynamics lead
to the empty network in various settings. In parameter settings, where the empty network
is not eﬃcient, we can interpret these dynamics as leading to an under-connected network
due to positive externalities. In the models with two-way ﬂow and/or decay externalities
and the consequences of externalities become even more apparent.
256 Concluding Remarks
We have introduced the notion of over-connected and under-connected networks in order
to contribute to a better understanding of the tension between stability and eﬃciency
in situations of strategic network formation. A network that is over-connected can be
socially improved by the deletion of links; a network that is under-connected can be
socially improved by the addition of links. In that way we can relate ineﬃcient outcomes
to externalities of link formation.
The basic argument is that positive spillovers/externalities lead to situations where agents
are not willing to form links, although it would be collectively beneﬁcial. Negative
externalities have the opposite eﬀect: agents form links without internalizing their harm
for other agents. Without restricting to any speciﬁc network formation model, we have
shown the following: for positive externalities, no stable network can be over-connected.
For negative externalities no stable network can be under-connected when some other
conditions are met. Thus, the ineﬃcient networks in one setting can be improved by the
addition of links, while the ineﬃcient networks in the other setting can be improved
by the severance of links. Furthermore, we have restated those central results in a
more general framework, which includes the formation of weighted networks and the
formation of directed networks. Those results are strong enough to exclude that in a
stable network any agent can be made better oﬀ by decreasing (respectively increasing)
the intensity/strength of some links.
Despite their intuitive character, our results are not trivial. It must be noted that
externalities are not the only source of ineﬃciency. Other sources of ineﬃciencies in
the bilateral formation of links are miscoordination of actions in the Consent Game,
restrictions on possible deviations, and rejection power in the Consent Game. The ﬁrst
issue can be solved by considering stability concepts that build on pairwise stability as
deﬁned in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). The second, however, is a problem of pairwise
stability itself since links are considered one by one. A set of links can have contrary
eﬀects than each single link. For example, Theorem 1 needs a concavity assumption to
rule out this source of ineﬃciency that potentially could point into a diﬀerent direction
than externalities. The third case of ineﬃciency can be illustrated in the example where a
player rejects a link although the partner would have beneﬁted heavily from it. This can be
ruled out by the introduction of transfers or a property called pairwise sign compatibility
(as shown in Theorem 3 and 4). In our work we have not addressed empirical and
experimental evidence on the formation of networks with externalities. Kosfeld (2004)
provides a survey of network experiments suggesting that, besides individual incentives,
considerations of eﬃciency or “fairness” might also play a role.
In this paper we have shown that positive externalities tend to induce under-connected
networks, while negative externalities tend to induce over-connected networks. The
contribution of our results is two-fold. Firstly, they shed light into the general tension
between stability and eﬃciency giving a social planner a clear signal in which situations
to impede and in which situations it is gainly to promote the formation of relationships.
Secondly, the results can be used in speciﬁc models to improve the characterization of
stable and eﬃcient networks. We have illustrated this with a few examples, while there are
many other models of strategic network formation that meet the required conditions. In
26particular, our results do not rely on assumptions of homogeneous agents or on restrictions
to unweighted and undirected networks. We hope that future research will come up
with more interesting models accounting for the various nature of social and economic
relationships.
27APPENDIX
Lemma 2. (Hellmann (2009))
The following statements are equivalent:
(1) u is convex (concave) in own links.
(2) u is convex (concave) in own new links.
(3) u is concave (convex) in own current links.
The proof is provided in Hellmann (2009).
Proof of Theorem 1. Let g ∈ [PS(u)] and suppose that u satisﬁes positive externalities
and concavity. We show that for all g0 ⊂ g it holds that ui(g0) ≤ ui(g) for all i ∈ N. Let
l := l(g,g0) = g \ g0 for some g0 ⊂ g, and denote li := li(g,g0) = l ∩ Li(g) and l−i := l \ li.
Since g is pairwise stable, all owners of a link prefer to have all their links in g, i.e.
ui(g) ≥ ui(g \ ij) for all j : ij ∈ li. By Lemma 2 concavity in own links is equivalent
to convexity in own current links, and thus it holds: ui(g) − ui(g \ li) = mui(g,li) ≥ P
ij∈li mui(g,ij) ≥ 0. Hence, ui(g) ≥ ui(g \ li).
Since u satisﬁes positive externalities, it holds for ˜ g := g \ li that ui(˜ g) ≥ ui(˜ g \ l−i)
(because player i does not own a link in l−i), i.e. l−i ∩ Li(g) = ∅). Therefore: ui(g) ≥
ui(g \li) ≥ u((g \li)\l−i) = u(g0). The same argument holds for all i ∈ N, implying that
w(g) ≥ w(g0) for any welfare function satisfying monotonicity.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let g be pairwise stable with transfers. We show that for




i∈N ui(g). Suppose that u satisﬁes positive
externalities and concavity. For g0 ⊂ g, let l := l(g,g0) := g \ g0 and for each i ∈ N let










mui(g,l) ≥ 0. (5)
Since u satisﬁes positive externalities, it holds for all i ∈ N that:
ui(g
0) ≤ ui(g
0 ∪ l−i). (6)




























To see why equality (*) holds, consider a link ij ∈ l: the link appears only in li










1{ij∈lk}[ui(g ∪ ij) −
ui(g)]
￿



















j:kj∈lk[ui(g ∪ ij) − ui(g)]
￿
. Hence, the sum of marginal utilities of any set of
links is non-negative, implying the proposition.
Proof of Remark 1. Let g ∈ ˜ G such that it is stable according to one of the stability
concepts, i.e. g ∈ [PS(u)]∪[PSt(u)]. Since u satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 1 and
Theorem 2 on ˜ G, we can show equivalently to both proofs that for all ¯ g ⊂ g it holds that
wu(¯ g) ≤ wu(g), since any ¯ g ⊂ g is by assumption contained in ˜ G.
Proof of Lemma 1. By Lemma 2 it suﬃces to show that uCO satisﬁes convexity in
own current links, that is ∀i ∈ N,∀g ∈ G,and ∀l ⊆ Li(g), it holds that muCO
i (g,l) ≥ P
ij∈l muCO
i (g,ij).
Denote κi(g,l) := {k ∈ N : dik(g) < dik(g \ l)} as the set of agents whose distance to
agent i increases when deleting the set of links l from network g. Since distances cannot
decrease when deleting links, we can rewrite marginal utility in the following way:
mu
CO
























Now, consider some network g, some player i and some set of player i’s links l ⊆ Li(g).
Suppose that |l| ≥ 2.28





28For |l| < 2 the claim mui(g,l) ≥
P

































To see that Eq. 8 cannot hold, note the following three properties of geodesic distances
that were already used in Calv´ o-Armengol and Ilkili¸ c (2007):
1. ∀k ∈ N and ∀ij ∈ l, it holds that (δdik(g) − δdik(g\l))wik ≥ (δdik(g) − δdik(g\ij))wik.
2. For all ij,im ∈ l, it holds that κi(g,ij) ∩ κi(g,im) = ∅.
3.
S
ij∈l κi(g,ij) ⊆ κi(g,l).
Thus, we conclude that mui(g,l) ≥
P
ij∈l mui(g,ij).
Proposition 4. In the symmetric connections model, gTetra is under-connected with
respect to the utilitarian welfare function for any parameters δ and c, for which gTetra
is pairwise stable.
Proof. We have to show that if δ and c are such that gTetra ∈ PS(uδ,c), then ∃g0 ⊃ gTetra
for which wδ,c(g0) > wδ,c(gTetra). Speciﬁcally, we show that the condition







5) := ub (9)
is necessary for stability, but suﬃcient for wδ,c(gTetra∪26) > wδ,c(gTetra). The label of the
players correspond to ﬁgure 1.
The ﬁrst part was done in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) already. Suppose that c > ub,
then player 1 beneﬁts from cutting 12 (because his change in beneﬁts is just ub).




j6=i δdij(gTetra) the marginal
beneﬁts for player i and by ∆ :=
P
i∈N βi the sum of marginal beneﬁts. This allows to
write
wδ,c(g
Tetra ∪ 26) > wδ,c(g
Tetra) ⇐⇒ ∆ > 2c. (10)
It is straightforward to derive that






























30and βi = 0 for all other i.
This yields










To show that ∆ > 2c under the condition c ≤ ub, it is suﬃcient to show that ∆ > 2ub
holds. Recall that,
















8 > 0 (13)
Numerically it can be checked that (13) holds for all δ ∈ (0,1) (we used Maple).





i∈N ui(g). Suppose that u satisﬁes negative externalities
and concavity. For g0 ⊃ g, let l := g0 \ g and for each i ∈ N let li = l ∩ Li(g0) and
l−i := l \ li(g,g0). Since u satisﬁes negative externalities, it holds for all i ∈ N that:
ui(g
0) ≤ ui(g
0 \ l−i). (14)
Concavity is equivalent to concavity in own new links, which implies for all i ∈ N:
ui(g ∪ li) − ui(g) ≤
X
j:ij∈li
ui(g ∪ ij) − ui(g). (15)




0) − ui(g)) =
X
i∈N


















ui(g ∪ ij) − ui(g) + uj(g ∪ ij) − uj(g)
(2)
≤ 0,
where the equality (*) holds because for each link ij ∈ l it holds that ij ∈ l1(k) if and
only if k ∈ {i,j} and only links in l are considered.
Proof of Theorem 4. We show ﬁrst [PS(u)] ⊆ [PSt(u)], and then [PS(u)] ⊇ [PSt(u)].
31‘⊆’ Let g be pairwise stable. By pairwise stability we get for all ij ∈ g that ui(g \ij) ≤
ui(g) and uj(g \ ij) ≤ uj(g), hence ui(g \ij) +uj(g \ij) ≤ ui(g)+ uj(g). Further it
holds by pairwise stability for all ij 6∈ g that either ui(g) = ui(g ∪ ij) and uj(g) =
uj(g∪ij) or for one of the two involved players i or j: ui(g) > ui(g∪ij). In the latter
case PSC implies also uj(g) > uj(g∪ij), hence ui(g∪ij)+uj(g∪ij) ≤ ui(g)+uj(g),
implying that g is pairwise stable with transfers.
‘⊇’ Let g be pairwise stable with transfers. Then it holds for all ij ∈ g that ui(g \
ij) + uj(g \ ij) ≤ ui(g) + uj(g), hence ui(g \ ij) ≤ ui(g) for at least one of the two
involved players. By PSC it has to hold that also uj(g \ ij) ≤ uj(g), satisfying the
ﬁrst condition for pairwise stability. Further, pairwise stability with transfer implies
for all ij 6∈ g that ui(g ∪ij)+uj(g ∪ij) ≤ ui(g)+uj(g). Thus ui(g ∪ij) ≤ ui(g) for
at least one of the two players. By PSC however this has to hold also for the other
player, i.e. uj(g ∪ ij) ≤ uj(g). Hence, g is also pairwise stable.
Proof of Remark 2. Let g ∈ ˜ G be pairwise stable with transfers. Since for all g0 ⊃ g
it holds that g0 ∈ ˜ G, and u satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 3 on ˜ G, we can show
equivalently to the proof of Theorem 3 that for all ¯ g ⊃ g it holds that wu(¯ g) ≤ wu(g).
We get the analogous result for pairwise stability if PSC is satisﬁed by Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 5. We have to show that for all g0 ⊃ g the following holds:
∃i ∈ N : ui(g
0) > 0 ⇒ ∃j ∈ N : uj(g
0) < uj(g).
Similarly to the above proofs, for g0 ⊃ g let l = g0 \ g, li = l ∩ Li(g0) and l−i = l \ li.
Let N(l) := {i ∈ N : li 6= ∅} be the set of players who are involved in at least one link
in l. Suppose that uk(g0) = uk(g) for all k / ∈ N(l) (otherwise the result is immediately
established because of non-positive externalities). Similarly to the proof of Theorem 3,









ui(g ∪ ij) − ui(g). (16)
Thus, for g0 to be Pareto preferred to g there has to exist an i : ui(g0) > ui(g) and thus
because of (16) there has to exist i1 ∈ N: ui(g∪ii1) > ui(g). But then because of pairwise
stability of g: ui1(g ∪ ii1) < ui1(g). However, for i1 to have ui1(g0) ≥ ui1(g), there has to
exist an i2 such that ui(g∪i1i2) > ui(g), since (16) holds and already ui1(g∪ii1) < ui1(g).
Continuing in this manner, for g0 to be Pareto preferred to g, there has to exists sequence
(ik)k=1,...,K of pairwise distinct players ik ∈ N(l) such that uik(g ∪ ikik+1) > uik(g). By
pairwise stability of g, muik(g ∪ ikik+1,ikik+1) > 0 implies muik+1(g ∪ ik+1ik,ik+1ik) < 0
for all k = 1,...,K − 1. Since transitivity of negative marginal utility in new links holds,
and muik+1(g ∪ ik+1ik) < 0 for all k = 1,...,K − 1, we get that muik(g ∪ ikij) < 0 for all
j < k, and thus ik / ∈ {i,i1,...,ik−1}, and hence K ≤ |N(l)|. But since N(l) is ﬁnite, we









uiK(g ∪ ij) − uiK(g) < 0,
32since uiK(g∪ij)−uiK(g) < 0 for all j ∈ {i,i1,...,iK−1}. Thus, if there exists a i ∈ N such
that ui(g0) > ui(g), then there has to exist a player j such that uj(g0) < uj(g), completing
the proof.
Proof of Corollary 3. We show here the obvious, that a regular pairwise stable network
is also pairwise stable with transfers, the remaining is implied by Theorem 3. If the utility
function satisﬁes (4) and the network is regular, then all players receive the same utility
since all arguments of the utility functions are equal. Alike are the marginal utilities of
any two involved players from forming a link. Since g is pairwise stable, we have for any
i,j ∈ N: mui(g∪ij,ij) = muj(g∪ij,ij) ≤ 0, and thus mui(g∪ij,ij)+muj(g∪ij,ij) ≤ 0,
implying pairwise stability with transfers. In the star for any two peripheral players same
considerations hold.
Proof of Proposition 1. All pairwise stable networks consist of completely connected
components that can be ordered according to size such that each larger component of
size m satisﬁes m > n2, where n is the size of the smaller component. There cannot be
singleton components, since each player is better oﬀ connecting to some player than to
none, and each player i wants a link to a player j, for whom dj ≤ di. Note that this implies
that there exists at least one component of size 3 if n ≥ 3. Since any even sized network of
n/2 separate pairs and any odd sized network of (n−2)/2 pairs and the remaining three
players being connected by 2 links is strongly eﬃcient, it is also component eﬃcient for
any component of size n and, hence, strictly welfare better than any completely connected
component of at least size 3. For the exact calculations see Jackson and Wolinsky (1996).
Hence any completely connected component of size 3 or larger contains a welfare better
subcomponent, whereas a completely connected component of size 2 is component welfare
maximizing, implying the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let c <
ρ
(ρ+2k+2)(ρ+2k), then for the welfare maximizing number
of links it holds that 1/2D∗(g) ≥ k. Since any network, which contains 1/2D∗(g) links is
welfare maximizing, any network, which has less than 1/2D∗(g) links is under-connected.
By Theorem 3 no pairwise stable network can be under-connected since uPR satisﬁes
negative externalities and concavity. Thus, any network g ∈ [PSt] has to contain at least
1/2D∗(g) ≥ k links.
Proof of Theorem 6. Given some outcome function Ψ that satisﬁes rejection power,
let there be a society (N,GΨ,u) such that u satisﬁes positive externalities in bilateral
network formation. Let g ∈ [NS(u)] and let g0 < g. We show that then ui(g0) ≤ ui(g) for
all i ∈ N.
For each i ∈ N let gi ∈ GΨ be such that gi
kl = gkl for all k,l 6= i and gi
kl = g0
kl otherwise.
Note that gi <i g. Since Ψ satisﬁes rejection power, we get that each i can change
strategies such that gi is induced. By Nash stability we get that ui(g) ≥ ui(gi).
It remains to show that for all i, ui(gi) ≥ ui(g0). For all k,l ∈ N let δkl = gi
kl − g0
kl be the
diﬀerences in link intensity between gi and g0. Note that by construction of gi it holds
33δkl = 0 if k = i or l = i and δkl ≥ 0, since g0 < g. By positive externalities, we get that
ui(gi) ≥ ui(g0), since gi = g0(∓kl)k,l∈Nδkl and δkl = 0 if k = i.
Thus, ui(g) ≥ ui(gi) ≥ ui(g0) for all i ∈ N implying that w(g) ≥ w(g0) for any welfare
function satisfying monotonicity.
Proof of Theorem 7. Let the outcome rule Ψ be unilateral such that gij = ψ(sij) for
all i,j ∈ N. We show the result for positive externalities, while the proof for negative
externalities works identically. Let g ∈ [NS(u)]. We show that for all g0 ∈ GΨ such that
g0 < g, it holds that ui(g0) ≤ ui(g) for all i ∈ N. Let ˜ g ∈ GΨ such that ˜ gkl = gkl for all
k 6= i and ˜ gkl = g0
kl if k = i.
Step 1: Since g is Nash stable, there exists s ∈ Ψ−1(g) such that s is a Nash equilbrium
in the corresponding game Γ. Let ˜ si := (˜ sij)j∈N with ˜ sij ∈ ψ−1(g0
ij) (that is a strategy
of player i that creates all his outgoing links as in g0). By construction it holds that
(s−i,˜ si) ∈ Ψ−1(˜ g). Since s is a Nash equilibrium, it holds that ui(Ψ(s)) ≥ ui(Ψ(s−i, ˜ si)) ⇔
ui(g) ≥ ui(˜ g).
Step 2: It remains to show that ui(˜ g) ≥ ui(g0). This is however directly implied by positive
externalities, since ˜ g = g0(+kl)k,l∈Nδkl such that δkl = 0 if k = i and δkl ≥ 0 for all k,l ∈ N
(by the construction of ˜ g).




≥ ui(g0). The same argument holds for all
i ∈ N, implying that w(g) ≥ w(g0) for any welfare function satisfying monotonicity.
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